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1 Introduction
Unawareness is probably the most common and most important kind of ignorance. Busi-
ness people invest most of their time not in updating prior beliefs and crossing out states
of the world that they previously assumed to be possible. Rather, their efforts are mostly
aimed at exploring unmapped terrain, trying to figure out business opportunities that
they could not even have spelled out before. More broadly, every book we read, every
new acquaintance we make, expands our horizon and our language, by fusing it with the
horizons of those we encounter, turning the world more intelligible and more meaningful
to us than it was before (Gadamer, 1960).
With this in mind, we should not be surprised that the standard state-spaces aimed
at modeling knowledge or certainty are not adequate for capturing unawareness (Dekel,
Lipman and Rustichini, 1998). Indeed, more elaborate models are needed (Fagin and
Halpern, 1988, Modica and Rustichini, 1994, 1999, Halpern, 2001). In all of these models,
the horizon of propositions the individual has in her disposition to talk about the world
is always a genuine part of the description of the state of affairs.
Things become even more intricate when several players are involved. Each player
may not only have different languages, but may also form a belief on the extent to which
other players are aware of the issues that she herself has in mind. And the complexity
continues further, because the player may be uncertain as to the sub-language that each
other player attributes to her or to others; and so on.
Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006) showed how an unawareness structure consisting
of a lattice of spaces is adequate for modeling mutual unawareness. Every space in
the lattice captures one particular horizon of meanings or propositions. Higher spaces
capture wider horizons, in which states correspond to situations described by a richer
vocabulary. The join of several spaces – the lowest space at least as high as every one of
them – corresponds to the fusion of the horizons of meanings expressible in these spaces.
In a companion work (Heifetz, Meier and Schipper, 2008), we showed the precise
sense in which such unawareness structures are adequate and general enough for modeling
mutual unawareness. We put forward an axiom system, which extends to the multi-player
case a variant of the axiom system of Modica and Rustichini (1999). We then showed
how the collections of all maximally-consistent sets of formulas in our system form a
canonical unawareness structure.1 In a parallel work, Halpern and Reˆgo (2008) devised
1Each space in the lattice of this canonical unawareness structure consists of the maximally consistent
sets of formulas in a sub-language generated by a subset of the atomic propositions.
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another sound and complete axiomatization for our class of unawareness structures.2
In this paper we extend unawareness structures so as to encompass probabilistic
beliefs (Section 2) rather than only knowledge or ignorance. The definition of types
(Definition 1), and the way beliefs relate across different spaces of the lattice, is a non-
trivial modification of the coherence conditions for knowledge operators in unawareness
structures, as formulated in Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006). We show that we obtain
all properties of unawareness suggested in the literature.
In Section 3 we define the notion of a common prior. Conceptually, a prior of a player
is a convex combination of (the beliefs of) her types (see e.g. Samet, 1998). If the priors
of the different players coincide, we have a common prior. A prior of a player induces a
prior on each particular space in the lattice, and if the prior is common to the players,
the induced prior on each particular space is common as well.
What are the implications of the existence of a common prior? First, we extend an
example from Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006) and show that speculative trade is com-
patible with the existence of a common prior (Section 1.1). This need not be surprising
if one views unawareness as a particular kind of “delusion”, since we know that with
deluded beliefs, speculative trade is possible even with a common prior (Geanakoplos,
1989). Nevertheless, we show that under a mild positivity condition, a common prior
is not compatible with common certainty of strict preference to carry out speculative
trade. That is, even though types with limited awareness are, in a particular sense, de-
luded, a common prior precludes the possibility of common certainty of the event that
based on private information players are willing to engage in a zero-sum bet with strictly
positive subjective gains to everybody. This is so because unaware types are “deluded”
only concerning aspects of the world outside their vocabulary, while a common prior
captures a prior agreement on the likelihood of whatever the players do have a common
vocabulary. An implication of this generalized no-trade theorem is that arbitrary small
transaction fees rule out speculative trade under unawareness. We complement this re-
sult by generalizing Aumann’s (1976) “No-Agreeing-to-disagree” result to unawareness
belief structures.
To what extend could unawareness be modeled by probability zero belief in appli-
2The precise connection between Fagin and Halpern (1988), Modica and Rustichini (1999), Halpern
(2001) and Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006) is understood from Halpern and Reˆgo (2008) and Heifetz,
Meier, and Schipper (2008). The connection between Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006, 2008) and
Galanis (2009a) is explored in Galanis (2009b). The connection with the models of Ewerhart (2001), Li
(2009) and Feinberg (2009) are yet to be explored.
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cations? First, assigning probability zero to an event is still compatible with realizing
what could happen if the probability zero event were nevertheless to obtain. This is
conceptually distinct from being completely unaware of the event, and it is the latter
concept that we want to model here. Second, if a modeler aims nevertheless to model
“unawareness” of an event as zero probability belief of that event, then this is impossi-
ble to do in a standard type-space. According to the symmetry axiom of awareness (see
Proposition 3), a decision maker is unaware of an event if and only if she is unaware of its
negation. So a decision maker being unaware of an event would have to assign probability
zero to the event and probability zero to the negation of the event. Because of additivity,
a probability measure in a standard type-space can never assign both zero to an event
and its complement. In Section 2.12 we show how to extend our definitions of types in
unawareness structures so as to characterize unawareness of an event as probability zero
belief of the existence of that event, where we interpret the event that some event E
exists as the set of states where this event does or does not happen, i.e. as the event
E ∪ ¬E. While such a characterization is trivial in a standard type-space because every
measurable event exists in every state, in our lattice of spaces the event that an event
E exists is non-trivial. We show that in the extended model a decision maker assigns
probability zero to the existence of an event if and only if she assigns probability zero to
the event and probability zero to its negation. Yet, unawareness modeled as probability
zero lacks transparency. If in the extended model a decision maker assigns probability
zero to an event, then it is not clear whether she does so because of being unaware of
the event or because she is aware of the event but assigns probability zero to the event
obtaining. We view this as a drawback of the probability zero model of “unawareness”.
In any case, we demonstrate that no matter whether the applied economist chooses to
model unawareness as unawareness proper or by probability zero belief, our (extended)
unawareness structures provide the appropriate modeling tool.
In the following section we present our interactive unawareness belief structure. In
Section 3 we define a common prior and investigate agreement and speculation under un-
awareness. Section 4 contains an informal discussion of the common prior and the related
literature. Some further properties of our unawareness belief structures are relegated to
the appendix. Proofs are relegated to the appendix as well. In a separate appendix,
Meier and Schipper (2009), we extend the “No-trade” theorem to infinite unawareness
structures.
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1.1 Introductory Example - Speculation under Unawareness
The purpose of the following example is threefold: First, it shall motivate the study of
unawareness and speculation under unawareness. Second, it should illustrate informally
some features of our model. Third, it is a counter example to the standard “No Trade”
theorems in the context of unawareness.
Consider a probabilistic version of the speculative trade example of Heifetz, Meier
and Schipper (2006). There is an owner, o, of a firm and a potential buyer, b, whose
awareness differ. The owner is aware that there may be a costly lawsuit [l] involving the
firm, but he is unaware of a potential novelty [n] enhancing the value of the firm. In
contrast, the buyer is aware that there might be an innovation, but he is unaware of the
lawsuit. Both are aware that the firm may face high sales [s] or not in future.
Both agents can only reason and form beliefs about contingencies of which they are
aware of respectively. The information structure is given in Figure 1. There are four
state-spaces of different expressive power. The description of each state is printed above
the state. While the upmost space, S{nls}, contains all contingencies, the space S{ls}
misses the novelty, S{ns} misses the law suit, and S{s} is capable of expressing only events
pertaining to the sales. At any state in the upmost space S{nls}, the buyer’s belief has full
support on the lower space S{ns} (as given by the solid ellipse and lines) and the seller’s
belief has full support on S{ls} (dashed ellipse and lines). Thus the buyer forms beliefs
about sales and the novelty but is unaware of the law suit, and the seller forms beliefs
about sales and the law suit but is unaware of the novelty. At any state in S{ns} the
seller’s belief has full support on the lower space S{s}. That is, the buyer is certain that
the seller is unaware of the novelty. Analogously, the seller is certain that the buyer is
unaware of the law suit since at any state in S{ls} the belief of the buyer has full support
on the space S{s}. Figure 1 provides an example of an unawareness structure developed
in this paper. The probability distribution given in each space illustrates an example of
a common prior in unawareness structures, a projective system of probability measures.
I.e., the prior on a lower space is the marginal of the prior in the upmost space. The
beliefs of both agents are consistent with the common prior.
Suppose that the status quo value of the firm with high sales is 100 dollars, but only
80 dollars with low sales. If the potential innovation obtains, this would add 20 dollars
to the value of the firm, whereas the potential lawsuit would cost the firm 20 dollars.
According to the beliefs at state (nls), the buyer’s expected value of the firm is 100,
whereas the seller’s expected value of the firm is 80 dollars. However, the buyer (resp.
seller) is certain that the seller’s (resp. buyer’s) expected value is 90 dollars.
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Figure 1: Information Structure in the Speculative Trade Example
nls n¬ls nl¬s n¬l¬s ¬nls ¬n¬ls ¬nl¬s ¬n¬l¬s
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
⅛ ⅛ ⅛ ⅛ ⅛ ⅛ ⅛ ⅛
ns n¬s ¬ns ¬n¬s
● ● ● ●
¼ ¼ ¼ ¼
ls l¬s ¬ls ¬l¬s
● ● ● ●
¼ ¼ ¼ ¼
s ¬s
● ●
½ ½
S{nls}
S{ns} S{ls}
S{s}
We assume that both players are rational in the sense of maximizing their respective
payoff given their belief and awareness. The buyer (resp. seller) prefers to buy (resp.
sell) at price x if her expected value of the firm is at least (resp. at most) x. The buyer
(resp. seller) strictly prefers to buy (resp. sell) at price x if her expected value of the
firm is strictly above (resp. strictly below) x.
Note that despite the fact that both agents’ beliefs are consistent with the common
prior, at state (nls) and at the price 90 dollars, there is common certainty of preference to
trade, but each player strictly prefers to trade. This is impossible in standard state-space
structures with a common prior. In standard “No Trade” theorems, if there is common
certainty of willingness to trade, then agents are necessarily indifferent to trade (Milgrom
and Stokey, 1982).
Despite this counter example to the “No Trade” theorems, we can prove in section 3
a generalized “No-trade” theorem according to which, if there is a common prior, then
there can not be common certainty of strict preference to trade.
6
2 Model
2.1 State-Spaces
Let S = {Sα}α∈A be a complete lattice of disjoint state-spaces, with the partial order 
on S. If Sα and Sβ are such that Sα  Sβ we say that “Sα is more expressive than Sβ
– states of Sα describe situations with a richer vocabulary than states of Sβ ”.
3 Denote
by Ω =
⋃
α∈A Sα the union of these spaces. Each S ∈ S is a measurable space, with a
σ-field FS.
Spaces in the lattice can be more or less “rich” in terms of facts that may or may not
obtain in them. The partial order relates to the “richness” of spaces. The upmost space
of the lattice may be interpreted as the “objective” state-space. Its states encompass full
descriptions.
2.2 Projections
For every S and S ′ such that S ′  S, there is a measurable surjective projection rS′S :
S ′ → S, where rSS is the identity. (“rS′S (ω) is the restriction of the description ω to the
more limited vocabulary of S.”) Note that the cardinality of S is smaller than or equal
to the cardinality of S ′. We require the projections to commute: If S ′′  S ′  S then
rS
′′
S = r
S′
S ◦ rS′′S′ . If ω ∈ S ′, denote ωS = rS′S (ω). If D ⊆ S ′, denote DS = {ωS : ω ∈ D}.
Projections “translate” states in “more expressive” spaces to states in “less expres-
sive” spaces by “erasing” facts that can not be expressed in a lower space.
2.3 Events
Denote g(S) = {S ′ : S ′  S}. For D ⊆ S, denote D↑ = ⋃S′∈g(S) (rS′S )−1 (D). (“All the
extensions of descriptions in D to at least as expressive vocabularies.”)
An event is a pair (E, S), where E = D↑ with D ⊆ S, where S ∈ S. D is called
the base and S the base-space of (E, S), denoted by S(E). If E 6= ∅, then S is uniquely
determined by E and, abusing notation, we write E for (E, S). Otherwise, we write ∅S
for (∅, S). Note that not every subset of Ω is an event.
3Here and in what follows, phrases within quotation marks hint at intended interpretations, but we
emphasize that these interpretations are not part of the definition of the set-theoretic structure.
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Some fact may obtain in a subset of a space. Then this fact should be also “express-
ible” in “more expressive” spaces. Therefore the event contains not only the particular
subset but also its inverse images in “more expressive” spaces.
Let Σ be the set of measurable events of Ω, i.e., D↑ such that D ∈ FS, for some
state-space S ∈ S. Note that unless S is a singleton, Σ is not an algebra because it
contains distinct ∅S for all S ∈ S.
2.4 Negation
If (D↑, S) is an event where D ⊆ S, the negation ¬(D↑, S) of (D↑, S) is defined by
¬(D↑, S) := ((S \D)↑, S). Note, that by this definition, the negation of a (measurable)
event is a (measurable) event. Abusing notation, we write ¬D↑ := (S \D)↑. Note that by
our notational convention, we have ¬S↑ = ∅S and ¬∅S = S↑, for each space S ∈ S. The
event ∅S should be interpreted as a “logical contradiction phrased with the expressive
power available in S.” ¬D↑ is typically a proper subset of the complement Ω \D↑ . That
is, (S \D)↑ $ Ω \D↑ .
Intuitively, there may be states in which the description of an event D↑ is both
expressible and valid – these are the states in D↑; there may be states in which its
description is expressible but invalid – these are the states in ¬D↑; and there may be
states in which neither its description nor its negation are expressible – these are the
states in
Ω \ (D↑ ∪ ¬D↑) = Ω \ S (D↑)↑ .
Thus our structure is not a standard state-space model in the sense of Dekel, Lipman,
and Rustichini (1998).
2.5 Conjunction and Disjunction
If
{(
D↑λ, Sλ
)}
λ∈L
is a finite or countable collection of events (with Dλ ⊆ Sλ, for λ ∈ L),
their conjunction
∧
λ∈L
(
D↑λ, Sλ
)
is defined by
∧
λ∈L
(
D↑λ, Sλ
)
:=
((⋂
λ∈LD
↑
λ
)
, supλ∈L Sλ
)
.
Note, that since S is a complete lattice, supλ∈L Sλ exists. If S = supλ∈L Sλ, then
we have
(⋂
λ∈LD
↑
λ
)
=
(⋂
λ∈L
((
rSSλ
)−1
(Dλ)
))↑
. Again, abusing notation, we write∧
λ∈LD
↑
λ :=
⋂
λ∈LD
↑
λ (we will therefore use the conjunction symbol ∧ and the intersec-
tion symbol ∩ interchangeably).
We define the relation ⊆ between events (E, S) and (F, S ′) , by (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ′) if
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Figure 2: Event Structure
 
• pq  • p¬q  •¬pq  •¬p¬q 
• p  • ¬p • q  • ¬q 
•∅ 
S{q}S{p} 
S{∅}
S{pq}
and only if E ⊆ F as sets and S ′  S. If E 6= ∅, we have that (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ′) if and
only if E ⊆ F as sets. Note however that for E = ∅S we have (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ′) if and
only if S ′  S. Hence we can write E ⊆ F instead of (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ′) as long as we keep
in mind that in the case of E = ∅S we have ∅S ⊆ F if and only if S  S(F ). It follows
from these definitions that for events E and F , E ⊆ F is equivalent to ¬F ⊆ ¬E only
when E and F have the same base, i.e., S(E) = S(F ).
The disjunction of
{
D↑λ
}
λ∈L
is defined by the de Morgan law
∨
λ∈LD
↑
λ = ¬
(∧
λ∈L ¬
(
D↑λ
))
.
Typically
∨
λ∈LD
↑
λ $
⋃
λ∈LD
↑
λ, and if all Dλ are nonempty we have that
∨
λ∈LD
↑
λ =⋃
λ∈LD
↑
λ holds if and only if all the D
↑
λ have the same base-space. Note, that by these
definitions, the conjunction and disjunction of (at most countably many measurable)
events is a (measurable) event.
Apart from the measurability conditions, the event-structure outlined so far is anal-
ogous to Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006, 2008). An example is shown in Figure 2. It
depicts a lattice with four spaces and projections. The event that p obtains is indicated
by the dotted areas, whereas the grey areas illustrate the event that not p obtains. Sp∪Sq
is for instance not an event in our structure.
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2.6 Probability Measures
Here and in what follows, the term ’events’ always measurable events in Σ unless other-
wise stated.
Let ∆ (S) be the set of probability measures on (S,FS). We consider this set itself as a
measurable space endowed with the σ-field F∆(S) generated by the sets {µ ∈ ∆ (S) : µ (D) ≥ p},
where D ∈ FS and p ∈ [0, 1].
2.7 Marginals
For a probability measure µ ∈ ∆ (S ′), the marginal µ|S of µ on S  S ′ is defined by
µ|S (D) := µ
((
rS
′
S
)−1
(D)
)
, D ∈ FS.
Let Sµ be the space on which µ is a probability measure. Whenever Sµ  S(E) then
we abuse notation slightly and write
µ (E) = µ (E ∩ Sµ) .
If S(E)  Sµ, then we say that µ(E) is undefined.
2.8 Types
I is the nonempty set of individuals. For every individual, each state gives rise to a
probabilistic belief over states in some space.
Definition 1 For each individual i ∈ I there is a type mapping ti : Ω →
⋃
α∈A∆ (Sα),
which is measurable in the sense that for every S ∈ S and Q ∈ F∆(S) we have t−1i (Q)∩S ∈
FS.
We require the type mapping ti to satisfy the following properties:
(0) Confinement: If ω ∈ S ′ then ti(ω) ∈ 4 (S) for some S  S ′.
(1) If S ′′  S ′  S, ω ∈ S ′′, and ti(ω) ∈ 4(S) then ti(ωS′) = ti(ω).
(2) If S ′′  S ′  S, ω ∈ S ′′, and ti(ω) ∈ 4(S ′) then ti(ωS) = ti(ω)|S.
(3) If S ′′  S ′  S, ω ∈ S ′′, and ti(ωS′) ∈ 4(S) then Sti(ω)  S.
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ti(ω) represents individual i’s belief at state ω. Properties (0) to (3) guarantee the
consistent fit of beliefs and awareness at different state-spaces. Confinement means that
at any given state ω ∈ Ω an individual’s belief is concentrated on states that are all
described with the same “vocabulary” - the “vocabulary” available to the individual at
ω. This “vocabulary” may be less expressive than the “vocabulary” used to describe
statements in the state ω.”
Properties (1) to (3) compare the types of an individual in a state ω and its projection
to ωS. Property (1) and (2) mean that at the projected state ωS the individual believes
everything she believes at ω given that she is aware of it at ωS. Property (3) means that
at ω an individual can not be unaware of an event that she is aware of at the projected
state ωS.
Define4
Beni (ω) :=
{
ω′ ∈ Ω : ti(ω′)|Sti(ω) = ti(ω)
}
.
This is the set of states at which individual i’s type or the marginal thereof coincides
with her type at ω. Such sets are events in our structure:
Remark 1 For any ω ∈ Ω, Beni(ω) is an Sti(ω)-based event, which is not necessarily
measurable.5
Assumption 1 If Beni(ω) ⊆ E, for an event E, then ti(ω)(E) = 1.
This assumption implies introspection (Property (va)) in Proposition 9 in the ap-
pendix. Note, that if Beni(ω) is measurable, then Assumption 1 implies ti(ω)(Beni(ω)) =
1.
Definition 2 We denote by Ω :=
〈
S,
(
rSαSβ
)
SβSα
, (ti)i∈I
〉
an interactive unawareness
belief structure.
2.9 Awareness and Unawareness
The definition of awareness is analogous to the definition in unawareness knowledge
structures (see Remark 6 in Heifetz, Meier and Schipper, 2008).
4The name “Ben” is chosen analogously to the “ken” in knowledge structures.
5Even in a standard type-space, if the σ-algebra is not countably generated, then the set of states
where a player is of a certain type might not be measurable.
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Definition 3 For i ∈ I and an event E, define the awareness operator
Ai (E) := {ω ∈ Ω : ti (ω) ∈ ∆ (S) , S  S (E)}
if there is a state ω such that ti(ω) ∈ ∆(S) with S  S(E), and by
Ai(E) := ∅S(E)
otherwise.
An individual is aware of an event if and only if his type is concentrated on a space
in which the event is “expressible.”
Proposition 1 If E is an event then Ai(E) is an S (E)-based event.
This proposition shows that the set of states in which an individual is aware of an
event is indeed an event in our structure. Moreover, the operator is convenient to work
with since the event Ai(E) has the same base-space as the event E.
Unawareness is naturally defined as the negation of awareness:
Definition 4 For i ∈ I and an event E, the unawareness operator is defined by
Ui(E) = ¬Ai(E).
Note that the definition of our negation and Proposition 1 imply that if E is an event,
then Ui(E) is an S (E)-based event.
Note further that Definition 3 and 4 apply also to events that are not necessarily
measurable.
2.10 Belief
The p-belief-operator is defined as usual (see for instance Monderer and Samet, 1989):
Definition 5 For i ∈ I, p ∈ [0, 1] and an event E, the p-belief operator is defined, as
usual, by
Bpi (E) := {ω ∈ Ω : ti(ω)(E) ≥ p},
if there is a state ω such that ti(ω)(E) ≥ p, and by
Bpi (E) := ∅S(E)
otherwise.
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Proposition 2 If E is an event then Bpi (E) is an S (E)-based event.
This proposition shows that the set of states in which an individual believes an event
with probability at least p is an event in our structure that has the same base-space as
the event E.
The p-belief operator has the standard properties stated in Proposition 9 in the ap-
pendix.
2.11 Properties of Unawareness
Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998) showed that in a standard state-space unawareness
must be trivial, even if the belief operator satisfies only very weak properties. In contrast,
we show that we obtain all properties suggested in the literature.6
Proposition 3 Let E be an event and p, q ∈ [0, 1]. The following properties of awareness
and belief obtain: 1. Plausibility: Ui(E) ⊆ ¬Bpi (E)∩¬Bpi ¬Bpi (E), 2. Strong Plausibility:
Ui(E) ⊆
⋂∞
n=1 (¬Bpi )n (E), 3. BpU Introspection: Bpi Ui(E) = ∅S(E) for p ∈ (0, 1] and
B0i Ui(E) = Ai(E), 4. AU Introspection: Ui(E) = UiUi(E), 5. Weak Necessitation:
Ai(E) = B
1
i
(
S(E)↑
)
, 6. Bpi (E) ⊆ Ai(E) and B0i (E) = Ai(E), 7. Bpi (E) ⊆ AiBqi (E),
8. Symmetry: Ai(E) = Ai(¬E), 9. A Conjunction:
⋂
λ∈LAi (Eλ) = Ai
(⋂
λ∈LEλ
)
, 10.
ABp Self Reflection: AiB
p
i (E) = Ai(E), 11. AA Self Reflection: AiAi(E) = Ai(E), and
12. BpiAi(E) = Ai(E).
Note that properties 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, and 12 hold also for non-measurable events,
because even if E is not measurable, by 5. Ai(E) is measurable.
Although we model awareness of events, Property 8 suggests that we model a notion
of awareness of issues or questions. Let an issue or question (E.g., “is the stock market
crashing?”) be such that it can be answered in the affirmative (“The stock market
is crashing.”) or the negative (“The stock market is not crashing.”). By symmetry
(Property 8), an individual is aware of an event if and only if she is aware of the its
negation. Thus we model the awareness of questions and issues rather than just single
events. In fact, by weak necessitation, Property 5, an individual is aware of an event E
6These properties are analogous to the properties in unawareness knowledge structures (Heifetz, Meier
and Schipper, 2006, 2008). Properties 1 to 5 have been suggested by Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini
(1998), and 8 to 11 by Fagin and Halpern (1988), Modica and Rustichini (1999) and Halpern (2001).
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if and only if she is aware of any event that can be “expressed” in a space with the same
“expressive power” as the base-space of E.
In Proposition 11 in the appendix, we state some multi-person properties of awareness
and belief. For instance, we show that if an individual is aware of an event E, then she
can also conceive that others are aware of the event E. Moreover, we show that common
awareness and mutual awareness coincide. That is, if everybody is aware of an event,
then everybody can conceive that everybody is aware of the event, everybody is aware
of that, etc.
2.12 Unawareness versus Zero Probability
In this section we discuss how unawareness of an event can be characterized as zero
probability belief of the existence of the event.
For any event E ∈ Σ, consider the event S(E)↑. We interpret this event as the event
that E exists. That is, in any state ω ∈ S(E)↑ either E or ¬E obtains. This interpretation
of S(E)↑ is crucial for the interpretation of unawareness as zero probability belief.
Let Sω be the space S ∈ S with ω ∈ S.
We extend the type mapping ti to a mapping t
Z
i by for all events E ∈ Σ,
tZi (ω)(E) :=

ti(ω)(E) if Sti(ω)  S(E)
0 if Sti(ω)  S(E) and Sω  S(E)
undefined otherwise.
That is, for every ω ∈ Ω the extended type mapping induces a belief over all events that
exist at ω.
We use the extended type mapping to define the zero probability belief operator on
events in Σ.
Definition 6 For i ∈ I and an event E ∈ Σ, the zero-probability operator is defined by
Zi(E) = {ω ∈ Ω : tZi (ω)(E) = 0}
if there is a state ω ∈ Ω such that tZi (ω)(E) = 0, and by
Zi(E) = ∅S(E)
otherwise.
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Note that different from standard state-spaces, we may have Zi(S(E)
↑) 6= ∅ for some
event E. (In this case it must be that S(E)  inf S.) That is, if Zi(S(E)↑) 6= ∅ then
there is a state in which agent i assigns zero probability belief to the event that the event
E exists.
Zero probability belief about the event that the event E exists characterizes unaware-
ness of the event.
Proposition 4 For any event E ∈ Σ, Zi(S(E)↑) = Ui(E).
Zero probability so defined in unawareness structures behaves differently from zero
probability belief in standard type-spaces because agents can assign not only zero prob-
ability to an event but also to the existence of an event. In particular we show in
Proposition 5 that in our unawareness structures, an agent assigns zero probability to
the existence of an event if and only if it assigns zero probability to the event and zero
probability to the negation of the event. This is impossible in a standard type-space.
Proposition 5 For any event E ∈ Σ, Zi(S(E)↑) = Zi(E) ∩ Zi(¬E).
In applications one may be tempted to work with zero probability only instead of
the notion of unawareness. The difficulty is that zero probability of an event becomes
an “overburdened” notion. This is because when an agent assigns zero probability to
an event she may do so because she is unaware of the event or because she is aware of
the event but assigns zero probability to it. In other words - taking Proposition 4 into
account - if an agent assigns zero probability to an event then she may do so because she
assigns zero probability to the existence of the event or she is certain of the existence of
the event but assigns zero probability to that the event obtains. Having both a notion of
unawareness and belief allows us to precisely distinguish between these two cases. This
is shown in the following proposition. Note that in the event B1i (¬E) agent i assigns zero
probability to the event E (and is aware of the event E).
Proposition 6 For any event E ∈ Σ, Zi(E) = Ui(E) ∪ (Ai(E) ∩B1i (¬E)).
Proposition 6 also implies that the zero probability operator is a map from Σ to Σ.
Corollary 1 For every event E ∈ Σ, Zi(E) is a S(E)-based event.
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To sum up, if instead of unawareness one wants to work with a notion of zero prob-
ability, then unawareness of an event corresponds to zero probability of the existence of
that event. Since such zero probability statements are impossible to express in standard
state-spaces, unawareness structures are useful because the lattice of spaces allows us to
model for each event E the event that E exists.
Furthermore, the notion of zero probability is less useful than the notion of unaware-
ness because it does not allow us to distinguish between zero probability of the event E
due to zero probability assigned to the existence of E or certainty of its existence but
zero probability that the event E obtains. Together with the fact that unawareness is
conceptually different from probability zero belief, this makes the zero probability model
inferior to the model of unawareness.
2.13 The Connection to Standard Type Spaces
We show how to derive standard type-space from our unawareness structure by “flatten-
ing” our lattice of spaces. Moreover, we demonstrate with a simple example that not
every standard type-space can be derived from non-trivial unawareness structures.
Definition 7 G ⊆ Ω is a measurable set if and only if for all S ∈ S, G ∩ S ∈ FS.
Notice that a measurable set is not necessarily an event in our special event structure.
Remark 2 The collection of measurable sets forms a sigma-algebra on Ω.
Remark 3 Let S be at most countable and G be a measurable set, p ∈ [0, 1] and i ∈ I.
Then {ω ∈ Ω : ti(ω)(G) ≥ p} is a measurable set.
Let Ω be an unawareness belief structure. We define the flattened type-space associ-
ated with the unawareness belief structure Ω by
F (Ω) := 〈Ω,F , (tFi )i∈I〉,
where Ω is the union of all state-spaces in the unawareness belief structure Ω, F is the
collection of all measurable sets in Ω, and tFi : Ω −→ ∆(Ω,F) is defined by
tFi (ω)(E) :=
{
ti(ω)(E ∩ Sti(ω)) if E ∩ Sti(ω) 6= ∅
0 otherwise
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A standard type-space on Y for the player set I is a tuple
Y :=
〈
Y,FY , (ti)i∈I
〉
,
where Y is a nonempty set, FY is a sigma-field on Y , and for i ∈ I, ti is a FY −F∆(Y ) mea-
surable function from Y to ∆ (Y,FY ), the space of countable additive probability mea-
sures on (Y,FY ), such that for all ω ∈ Y and E ∈ FY : [ti (ω)] ⊆ E implies ti (ω) (E) = 1,
where [ti (ω)] := {ω′ ∈ Y : ti (ω′) = ti (ω)}.
Proposition 7 If Ω is an unawareness belief structure, then F (Ω) is a standard type-
space. Moreover, it has the following property: For every p > 0, measurable set E ∈ F
and i ∈ I: {ω ∈ Ω : ti(ω)(E) ≥ p} = {ω ∈ Ω : tFi (ω)(E) ≥ p}.
A flattened unawareness structure is just a standard type-space. To derive such a
type-space, one extends a player’s type mapping by assigning probability zero to mea-
surable sets for which the player’s belief was previously undefined. Of course, once
an unawareness structure is flattened, there is no way to analyze reasoning about un-
awareness anymore since by Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998) unawareness is trivial.
Moreover, there is no way to analyze probability zero belief of the existence of an event
as in the previous section.
Note that the converse to Proposition 7 is not true. I.e., given a standard type-space,
it is not always possible to find some unawareness structure with non-trivial unaware-
ness. This is illustrated in the following counter-example. We conclude that not every
standard types-space with zero probability can be used to model unawareness. The pre-
cise restrictions required for modeling unawareness are made transparent in unawareness
belief structures.
Example 1 Let Y = {ω1, ω2, ω3} with ti(ω1) = ti(ω2) = ti(ω3) = τi and τi({ω1}) =
τi({ω2}) = 12 and τi({ω3}) = 0. If Ω = S = Y , then by Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini
(1998) the unawareness structure has trivial unawareness only. Any non-trivial partition
of Y into separate spaces yields either no projections or violates properties (0) to (3). 
3 Common Prior, Agreement, and Speculation
In this section, we define a common prior and explore the implications. In Section
1.1, we showed by example that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out
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speculative trade under unawareness. With unawareness, we can have common certainty
of willingness to trade but strict preference to trade. Yet, we are able to prove a “No-
Trade” theorem according to which there can not be common certainty of strict preference
to trade under unawareness. In the same vein, we prove a “No-Agreeing-to-Disagree”
theorem.
3.1 Common Belief
From now on, we assume that the set of individuals I is at most countable.
We define mutual and common belief as usual (e.g. Monderer and Samet, 1989):
Definition 8 The mutual p-belief operator on events is defined by
Bp(E) =
⋂
i∈I
Bpi (E).
The common certainty operator on events is defined by
CB1 (E) =
∞⋂
n=1
(
B1
)n
(E).
That is, the mutual p-belief of an event E is the event in which everybody p-believes
the event E. Common certainty of E is the event that everybody is certain of the event
E, and everybody is certain that everybody is certain of the event E, everybody is certain
of that, ... ad infinitum. Common certainty is the generalization of common knowledge
to the probabilistic notion of certainty. Note that Proposition 2 and the definition of
the conjunction of events imply that Bp(E) and CB1 (E) are S(E)-based events, for any
measurable event E.
We say that an event E is common certainty at ω ∈ Ω if ω ∈ CB1 (E).
Propositions 10 and 11 (see appendix) state some properties of belief and awareness
in the multiperson context.
3.2 Priors and Common Priors
In a standard type-space S, a prior P Si of player i is a convex combination of the beliefs
of i’s types in S (Samet, 1998). That is, for every event E ∈ FS,
P Si (E) =
∫
S
ti (·) (E) dP Si (·) . (1)
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In particular, if S is finite or countable, this equality holds if and only if
P Si (E) =
∑
s∈S
ti (s) (E)P
S
i ({s}) . (2)
In words, to find the probability P Si (E) that the prior P
S
i assigns to an event E, one
should check the beliefs ti (s) (E) ascribed by player i to the event E in each state s ∈ S,
and then average these beliefs according to the weights P Si ({s}) assigned by the prior
P Si to the different states s ∈ S.
P S is a common prior on S if P S is a prior for every player i ∈ I.
Here we generalize these definitions to unawareness structures, as follows.
Definition 9 (Prior) A prior for player i is a system of probability measures Pi =(
P Si
)
S∈S ∈
∏
S∈S ∆(S) such that
1. The system is projective: If S ′  S then the marginal of P Si on S ′ is P S′i . (That
is, if E ∈ Σ is an event whose base-space S (E) is lower or equal to S ′, then
P Si (E) = P
S′
i (E).)
2. Each probability measure P Si is a convex combination of i’s beliefs in S: For every
event E ∈ Σ such that S(E)  S,
P Si (E ∩ S ∩ Ai (E)) =
∫
S∩Ai(E)
ti (·) (E) dP Si (·) . (1u)
P =
(
P S
)
S∈S ∈
∏
S∈S ∆(S) is a common prior if P is a prior for every player i ∈ I.
In particular, if S is finite or countable, equality (1u) holds if and only if
P Si (E ∩ S ∩ Ai (E)) =
∑
s∈S∩Ai(E)
ti (s) (E)P
S
i ({s}) . (2u)
What is the reason for the difference between (1) and (1u) (or similarly between (2)
and (2u))? With unawareness, ti (s) (E) is well defined only for states s ∈ S in which
player i is aware of E, i.e., the states s ∈ S ∩Ai (E). This is the cause for the difference
in the definition of the domain of integration (or summation) on the right-hand side.
Consequently, E (or equivalently E ∩ S) on the left-hand side of (1) and (2) is replaced
by E ∩ S ∩ Ai (E) in (1u) and (2u).
An example of an unawareness structure with a common prior is given in Figure 3.
A discussion of the common prior (and Figure 3) is deferred to Section 4.1.
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Figure 3: Illustration of a Common Prior
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3.3 Speculative Trade
In this section, we investigate whether the common prior assumption implies the absence
of speculative trade (e.g. Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). The example in Section 1.1 shows
that speculation is possible under unawareness even if we assume that there is a common
prior. Despite this counter example to the “No-trade” theorems, we prove below a
generalized “No-trade” theorem according to which, if there is a common prior, then
there can not be common certainty of strict preference to trade. That is, even with
unawareness it is not the case that “everything goes”. We find this surprising, because
unawareness can be interpreted as a special form of “delusion”: At a given state of a
space, a player’s belief may be concentrated in a very different lower state-space.
The following example demonstrates that speculative trade is possible in delusional
standard state-space structures with a common prior.
Example 4 (Speculative Trade with Delusion) Consider the information structure
in Figure 4. The common prior and the information structure allows the dashed player
to have a posterior of tdashed(ω1)({ω1}) = tdashed(ω2)({ω1}) = 1 and the solid player
tsolid(ω1)({ω2}) = tsolid(ω2)({ω2}) = 1. So they may happily disagree on the expected
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Figure 4: Speculative Trade with Delusion
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value of a random variable defined on this standard state-space. 
Denote by [ti(ω)] := {ω′ ∈ Ω : ti(ω′) = ti(ω)}.
Definition 10 A common prior P =
(
P S
)
S∈S ∈
∏
S∈S ∆(S) is positive if and only if for
all i ∈ I and ω ∈ Ω: If ti (ω) ∈ 4 (S ′), then [ti(ω)]∩S ′ ∈ FS′ and P S
(
([ti (ω)] ∩ S ′)↑ ∩ S
)
>
0 for all S  S ′.
For every type, a positive common prior puts a positive weight on each “stationary”
state where the player has this type. This technical condition serves the same purpose
as the assumption in Aumann (1976) that the prior puts strict positive weight on each
partition cell in his finite partitional structure. Our condition implies that for each player
there can be at most countably many types in each space.
Definition 11 Let x1 and x2 be real numbers and v a random variable on Ω. Define the
sets E≤x11 :=
{
ω ∈ Ω : ∫
St1(ω)
v (·) d (t1 (ω)) (·) ≤ x1
}
and
E≥x22 :=
{
ω ∈ Ω : ∫
St2(ω)
v (·) d (t2 (ω)) (·) ≥ x2
}
. We say that at ω, conditional on his
information, player 1 (resp. player 2) believes that the expectation of v is weakly below
x1 (resp. weakly above x2) if and only if ω ∈ E≤x11 (resp. ω ∈ E≥x21 ).
Note that the sets E≤x11 or E
≥x2
2 may not be events in our unawareness belief structure,
because v (ω) 6= v (ωS) is allowed, for ω ∈ S ′  S. Yet, we can define p-belief, mutual
p-belief and common certainty for measurable subsets of Ω, and show that the properties
stated in Propositions 9 and 10 obtain as well. The proofs are analogous and thus
omitted.7
7Contrary to our definition of the negation of an event, in point (ii) of Proposition 9, ¬E is here
understood to be the relative complement of E with respect to the union of state-spaces.
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Theorem 1 Let Ω be a finite unawareness belief structure and P =
(
P S
)
S∈S ∈
∏
S∈S ∆(S)
be a positive common prior. Then there is no state ω˜ ∈ Ω such that there are a random
variable v : Ω −→ R and x1, x2 ∈ R, x1 < x2, with the following property: at ω˜ it is
common certainty that conditional on her information, player 1 believes that the expec-
tation of v is weakly below x1 and, conditional on his information, player 2 believes that
the expectation of v is weakly above x2.
The theorem says that if there is a positive common prior, then there can not be
common certainty of strict preference to trade. Together with our example of speculative
trade under unawareness we conclude that a common prior does not rule out speculation
under unawareness but it can never be common certainty that both players expect to
strictly gain from speculation. The theorem implies as a corollary that given a positive
common prior, arbitrary small transaction fees rule out speculative trade under unaware-
ness.
So, with respect to speculative trade, heterogeneous unawareness with a common prior
is “intermediate” between common awareness with heterogeneous priors on the one hand,
and common awareness with a common prior on the other hand. With heterogeneous
priors even in standard state-spaces, common certainty of strict preference to trade is
possible.
In Meier and Schipper (2009), we extend the above “No-trade” theorem to infinite
unawareness belief structures. To this end we introduce topological unawareness belief
structures.
The following example shows that the converse of the “No-trade” theorem does not
hold.
Example 5 Consider the information structure with two spaces in Figure 5. There
are two players: The information structure of the first (resp. second) player is given
by the solid (resp. intermitted) objects. The belief of the first (resp. second) player is
given above (resp. below) the states. Since the relative weights differ, there can not be
a positive common prior. In fact, there is not even a common prior since equation (2u)
of Definition 9 imposed on the priors of both individuals would imply that the common
prior assigns probability zero to all states in S ′. Note that the only measurable sets that
are common certainty among both players are Ω = S ′ ∪ S and S. Yet, it is not true that
in all states in Ω or S player 1’s expectation of a random variable differs from player 2’s
expectation. E.g., at ω6 both player’s expectations of the random variable must agree.
Thus, the absence of common certainty of strict preference to trade does not imply the
22
existence of a (positive) common prior.
Figure 5: Information Structure of the Counter-Example
3.4 Agreement
For an event E and p ∈ [0, 1] define the set [ti(E) = p] := {ω ∈ Ω : ti(ω)(E) = p}, if
{ω ∈ Ω : ti(ω)(E) = p} is nonempty, and otherwise set [ti(E) = p] := ∅S(E).
Lemma 1 [ti(E) = p] is a S(E)-based event.
Proof. [ti(E) = p] = B
p
i (E)∩B1−pi (¬E). Hence the claim follows from Proposition 2.
The following proposition is a generalization of the standard “No-Agreeing-to-Disagree”
theorem (Aumann, 1976):
Proposition 8 Let Ω be an unawareness belief structure, G be an event and pi ∈ [0, 1],
for i ∈ I. Suppose there exists a common prior P = (P S)
S∈S ∈
∏
S∈S ∆(S) such that
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for some space S  S(G) we have P S(CB1(⋂i∈I [ti(G) = pi])) > 0. Then pi = pj, for all
i, j ∈ I.8
The proposition asserts the following: Suppose individuals have a common prior that
is weakly positive in the sense that it assigns strict positive probability to the event that
posteriors of G are common certainty. Then common certainty of posteriors for the event
G implies that those posteriors must agree across all individuals. So individuals with a
common prior can not agree-to-disagree on the posteriors of events which they are all
aware of.
Remark 4 A positive common prior (Definition 10) implies the condition P S(CB1(
⋂
i∈I [ti(G) =
pi])) > 0 in Proposition 8 if CB
1(
⋂
i∈I [ti(G) = pi]) is nonempty and S  S(G).
4 Discussion
4.1 Common Priors
How could a prior be interpreted? Following the discussion of the notion of a prior in
standard Bayesian analysis by Savage (1954), Morris (1995) and Samet (1999), we like
to distinguish three interpretations: First, a prior is interpreted verbally as a player’s
subjective belief at a prior stage. Second, the prior is a coherence condition on the
player’s types. Third, the prior is the long run relative frequency of repeated events
observed by the player in the past.
Consider the first interpretation. A prior is a subjective belief at a prior stage before
the player received further information which led her to the interim belief ti(ω). With
unawareness, this interpretation is nonsensical. One would have to imagine that the
player had been aware of all relevant aspects of reality at the prior stage, but then
became unaware of some of them (while nevertheless having received more information
regarding other aspects).
In standard Bayesian analysis, Samet (1999) put forward a second interpretation of
a prior as a coherence condition on types: For every event E ∈ Σ and every p ∈ [0, 1],
every type of the player answers affirmatively to the question “Given that tomorrow you
will assign to the event E probability at least p, do you assign to E probability at least
8In the appendix, we prove a more general version in which we require only a common prior on a
space S  S(G) satisfying the condition stated in the proposition.
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p now?” This interpretation is conceptually valid also for unawareness belief structures
with an important qualification: Every type of the player is asked these questions only
for events of which she is aware because otherwise a question by itself may make the
type aware of an event of which she was previously unaware. While this qualification
is vacuous in standard Bayesian analysis - because of the implicit assumption of full
awareness - it implies for unawareness belief structures that each type is “aware” only
of the prior restricted to the events that she is aware of. Moreover, every type can only
perceive the beliefs of her types of which she is aware. This emphasizes that the prior is
derived from types rather than being a primitive of the model.
The third interpretation views the prior as the relative frequency of events observed
previously by the individual as history goes to infinity and before receiving information
which led to her interim belief ti(ω). Again, with unawareness such a interpretation is
nonsensical. One would have to imagine that the player had been measuring all events
in history, but then became unaware of some of them (while nevertheless having received
more information regarding other events). To recapture the validity of the frequentist
interpretation, we must assume that every player can observe only events that she is
aware of interim. This assumption is quite reasonable since a player can only measure
what she is aware of. For instance, meteorologists were unable to measure ozone before
they became aware of it. Yet, the applicability of the frequentist interpretation may
be limited since we allow also for conditioning on unobservable events (such as types
of other players), a caveat that applies not only to unawareness belief structures but to
belief structures in general.
A common prior is an identical prior among all players. In an unawareness belief
structures with a common prior, each type is only “aware” of the common prior among
the types (of hers or other players) that she is aware of. Figure 3 illustrates a common
prior in an unawareness belief structure. Odd (resp. even) states in the upper space
project to the odd (resp. even) state in the lower space. There are two individuals,
one indicated by the solid lines and ellipses and another by dashed lines and ellipses.
Note that the ratio of probabilities over odd and even states in each “information cell”
coincides with the ratio in the “information cell” in the lower space.
The positivity condition (Definition 10) requires that for every player and every type,
the common prior puts strict positive weight on the set of “stationary” states where the
player has this type. It ensures that the common prior indeed imposes consistency on the
types. To see this, consider once again Figure 3. Replace the common prior by a prior
that assigns 1
6
to each state ω9, ω10, ω11 and
3
6
to ω12, and zero to all other states in S
′.
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The prior probabilities for states in S remain unchanged. This prior is common prior but
it does not satisfy the positivity assumption of Definition 10. In particular, this common
prior does not constrain any player’s types with beliefs on S ′. So, for unawareness belief
structures the positivity assumption on the common prior ensures that the common
prior constrains the beliefs of types not just locally on some space but across the lattice.
Essentially, it is in the spirit of common prior assumption according to which different
beliefs are only due to differences in information. The positivity condition also implies
that for each player there can be at most countably many types in each space. Moreover,
in terms of awareness it implies that for every pair of players, i and j, and every event
E, if i is certain that j is aware of the event E, then j is indeed aware of the event E.
If an unawareness belief structure has a common prior, then the associated flattened
model (see Section 2.13) has a common prior. To see this, note that the common prior al-
ways induces a common prior on the smallest space, which implies that there is a common
prior in the flattened model. If an unawareness belief structure has a positive common
prior, then it does not follow that there is a positive common prior in the flattened model.
To see this consider once again Figure 3. A common prior in the associated flattened
model must ascribe probability zero to all states in S ′. Such common prior clearly vi-
olates the positivity assumption of Definition 10. Again, this example demonstrates a
difference between unawareness belief structures and standard type-spaces.
What are the implications of the absence of speculation on the priors? For standard
type-spaces, the converse to the “No-trade” theorem characterizes the common prior as-
sumption through the absence of speculative trade (Morris, 1994, Bonanno and Nehring,
1999, Feinberg, 2000, Halpern, 2002, Heifetz, 2006). Example 5 shows that we can not
characterize positive common priors or even just common priors on unawareness belief
structures by the absence of common certainty of strict preference to trade. Does our
notion of “No-trade” imply at least the existence of a common prior in the flattened
model? First, note that our notion of “No-trade” is slightly different from the literature:
For instance, Feinberg (2000) characterizes the common prior by the absence of com-
mon certainty of speculation for some states. We show that a positive common prior
implies the absence of common certainty of speculation for all states. Hence, our notion
of “No-trade” implies Feinberg’s notion of “No-trade”.9 Since Feinberg showed that his
notion of “No-trade” implies a common prior for standard type-spaces, the existence of
9We opted for our notion of “local” speculation because intuitively one is interested to know whether
there are some states (as opposed to all states) where players speculate. Our notion of “No-trade”
coincides with Feinberg’s notion on belief closed subsets.
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a common prior for the flattened model of an unawareness belief structure follows from
his result. Note that the impossibility of the converse to a “No-trade” theorem for un-
awareness belief structures is not due to the different notion of “No-trade” employed.
To see this, consider once again Example 5. At state ω6 it is not common certainty
that players want to speculate. Yet, we noticed already that there is no common prior
in this model. Hence, also “No-trade” in the sense of Feinberg does not imply a com-
mon prior in unawareness belief structures. To sum up, we show that it is still possible
to define the common prior assumption under unawareness. Moreover, our “No-trade”
theorem demonstrates that the common prior assumption enhanced by positivity im-
poses discipline. Yet, contrary to standard type-spaces the common prior assumption
is not “provable” by the absence of speculation under unawareness, it just remains (in
principle) “falsifiable”. The possibility of characterizing a common prior by absence of
speculation in the standard type-space versus the impossibility of such characterization
in unawareness belief structures illustrates an important difference between unawareness
belief structures and standard type-spaces.
4.2 Related Literature
There is a growing literature on unawareness both in economics and computer science.
The independent parallel work of Sadzik (2006) is closest to ours. Building to a certain
extent on our earlier work, Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006), he presents a framework
of unawareness with probabilistic beliefs in which the common prior on the upmost space
is a primitive. In contrast, we take types as primitives and define a prior on the entire
unawareness belief structure as a convex combination of the type’s beliefs.
In a companion paper, Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2009a), we apply unawareness
belief structures to develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define solutions, and prove
existence. Moreover, we investigate the robustness of equilibria to uncertainty about
opponents’ unawareness of actions.
Feinberg (2009) discusses games with unawareness by modeling games and many
views thereof, each (mutual) view being a finite sequence of player names i1, ..., in with
the interpretation that this is how i1 views how .... how in views the game. This differs
from our unawareness belief structures in which each state “encapsulates” the views of
the players, their views about other players’ views etc. in a standard and parsimonious
way.
Halpern and Reˆgo (2006), Reˆgo and Halpern (2007), Li (2006) and Heifetz, Meier
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and Schipper (2009b) and Feinberg (2009) present models of extensive form games with
unawareness and analyze solution concepts for them. Li (2006) is based on Li (2009), in
which she presents a set theoretic model with knowledge and non-trivial unawareness.
A state-space is a product set where each dimension corresponds to an issue. A deci-
sion maker may be unaware of some issues by “living in” a space with less dimensions.
Modica (2008) studies the updating of probabilities and argues that new information
may change posteriors more if it implies also a higher level of awareness. A dynamic
framework for a single decision maker with unawareness is introduced by Grant and
Quiggin (2007). Ewerhart (2001) studies the possibility of agreement under a notion of
unawareness different from the aforementioned literature. Lastly, Ahn and Ergin (2009)
consider explicitly more or less fine descriptions of acts and characterize axiomatically
a partition-dependent subjective expected utility representation. Since the set of all
partitions of a state-space forms a complete lattice, their approach suggests a decision
theoretic foundation of subjective probabilities on our lattice structure.
More recently we learned that Board and Chung (2009) presented a different model
of unawareness in which they also study speculative trade under what they term living
in “denial” and “paranoia”. The precise connection to our results is yet to be explored.
Appendices
A Properties of Belief and Awareness
Proposition 9 Let E and F be events, {El}l=1,2,... be an at most countable collection of
events, and p, q ∈ [0, 1]. The following properties of belief obtain:
(o) Bpi (E) ⊆ Bqi (E), for q ≤ p,
(i) Necessitation: B1i (Ω) = Ω,
(ii) Additivity: Bpi (E) ⊆ ¬Bqi (¬E), for p+ q > 1,
(iiia) Bpi (
⋂∞
l=1El) ⊆
⋂∞
l=1B
p
i (El),
(iiib) for any decreasing sequence of events {El}∞l=1, Bpi (
⋂∞
l=1El) =
⋂∞
l=1 B
p
i (El),
(iiic) B1i (
⋂∞
l=1El) =
⋂∞
l=1 B
1
i (El),
(iv) Monotonicity: E ⊆ F implies Bpi (E) ⊆ Bpi (F ),
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(va) Introspection: Bpi (E) ⊆ B1iBpi (E),
(vb) Introspection II: BpiB
q
i (E) ⊆ Bqi (E), for p > 0.
In our unawareness belief structure, Necessitation means that an individual always
is certain of the universal event Ω, i.e. she is certain of “tautologies with the lowest
expressive power.” (ii) means that if an individual believes an event E with at least
probability p, then she can not believe the negation of E with any probability strictly
greater than 1− p. Property (iii a - c) are variations of conjunction, i.e., if an individual
believes a conjunction of events with probability at least p, then she p-believes each of
the events. The interpretation of monotonicity is: If an event E implies an event F , then
p-believing the event E implies that the individual also p-believes the event F . Property
(v) concerns the introspection of belief: If an individual believes the event E with at least
probability p then she is certain that she believes the event E with at least probability
p. Also, if she believes with positive probability that she p-believes an event, the she
actually p-believes this event.
Definition 12 An event E is evident if for each i ∈ I, E ⊆ B1i (E).
Proposition 10 For every event F ∈ Σ:
(i) CB1(F ) is evident, that is CB1(F ) ⊆ B1i (CB1(F )) for all i ∈ I.
(ii) There exists an evident event E such that ω ∈ E and E ⊆ B1i (F ) for all i ∈ I, if
and only if ω ∈ CB1(F ).
The proof is analogous to Proposition 3 in Monderer and Samet (1989) for a standard
state-space and thus omitted.
Analogously to mutual belief and common belief, we define mutual awareness and
common awareness:
Definition 13 The mutual awareness operator on events is defined by
A(E) =
⋂
i∈I
Ai(E),
and the common awareness operator on events is defined by
CA(E) =
∞⋂
n=1
(A)n (E).
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Mutual awareness of an event E is the event that everybody is aware of E. Common
awareness of an event E is the event that everybody is aware of E, everybody is aware
that everybody is aware of E, everybody is aware of that ... ad infinitum.
Proposition 11 Let E be an event and p, q ∈ [0, 1]. The following multi-person proper-
ties obtain:
1. Ai(E) = AiAj(E) 7.
Bp(E) ⊆ CA(E),
B0(E) = CA(E),
2. Ai(E) = AiB
p
j (E) 8.
Bp(E) ⊆ A(E),
B0(E) = A(E),
3. Bpi (E) ⊆ AiBqj (E), 9. A(E) = B1(S(E)↑)
4. Bpi (E) ⊆ AiAj(E), 10. CA(E) = B1(S(E)↑)
5. CA(E) = A(E), 11. CB1(S(E)↑) ⊆ A(E)
6. CB1(E) ⊆ CA(E), 12. CB1(S(E)↑) ⊆ CA(E)
Note that properties 1, 5, 9, 10, 11 and 12 also hold for non-measurable events.
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Remark 1
Define D := {ω′ ∈ Sti(ω) : ti(ω′) = ti(ω)}. I.e., D = Beni(ω) ∩ Sti(ω). We need to show
that D↑ = Beni(ω).
Consider first “⊆”: If ω′ ∈ D↑ then ω′Sti(ω) ∈ Beni(ω). This is equivalent to
ti(ω
′
Sti(ω)
) = ti(ω) ∈ 4(Sti(ω)). By (3) we have Sti(ω′)  Sti(ω). By (2), ti(ω′Sti(ω)) =
ti(ω
′)|Sti(ω) . It follows that ti(ω
′)|Sti(ω) = ti(ω). Thus ω
′ ∈ Beni(ω).
“⊇”: ω′ ∈ Beni(ω) if and only if ti(ω′)|Sti(ω) = ti(ω). Hence for ω′ ∈ Beni(ω), we
have Sti(ω′)  Sti(ω). By (2) ti(ω′Sti(ω)) = ti(ω
′)|Sti(ω) = ti(ω). Hence ω
′
Sti(ω)
∈ D. Thus
ω′ ∈ D↑. 
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Ai(E) is an S(E)-based event if there exists a subset D ⊆ S(E) s.t. D↑ = Ai(E).
Assume that Ai(E) is non-empty. Define D := {ω ∈ S(E) : ti(ω) ∈ ∆(S(E))}. By
definition of the awareness operator, D = Ai(E) ∩ S(E). We show that D↑ = Ai(E).
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Let ω ∈ D↑, that is ω ∈ S ′ for some S ′  S(E) and ωS(E) ∈ D. This is equivalent
to ti(ωS(E)) ∈ ∆(S(E)). By 0. follows S ′  Sti(ω). By 3. we have Sti(ω)  S(E). Thus
ω ∈ Ai(E). (Note that Ai(E) = {ω ∈ Ω : Sti(ω)  S(E)}.)
In the reverse direction, let ω ∈ Ai(E), i.e., ti(ω) ∈ ∆(S) with S  S(E). By 0.,
ω ∈ S ′ with S ′  S. Consider ωS(E). By 2., ti(ωS(E)) = ti(ω)|S(E). Hence ωS(E) ∈ D.
Thus ω ∈ D↑.
Finally, if Ai(E) is empty, then by definition of the awareness operator, we have
Ai(E) = ∅S(E). 
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Bpi (E) is an S(E)-based event if there exists a subset D ⊆ S(E) s.t. D↑ = Bpi (E).
Assume that Bpi (E) is non-empty. Define D := {ω ∈ S(E) : ti(ω)(E) ≥ p}. By definition
of the p-belief operator, D = Bpi (E) ∩ S(E). We show that D↑ = Bpi (E).
Let ω ∈ D↑, that is ω ∈ S ′ for some S ′  S(E) and ωS(E) ∈ D. This is equivalent to
ti(ωS(E))(E) ≥ p. By 0. Sti(ωS(E)) = S(E). By 3. we have Sti(ω)  S(E). By 2. it follows
that p ≤ ti(ωS(E))(E) = ti(ω)|S(E)(E). Hence ti(ω)(E) ≥ p. Thus ω ∈ Bpi (E).
In the reverse direction, let ω ∈ Bpi (E), i.e., ti(ω)(E) ≥ p. Since ti(ω)(E) ≥ p it
follows that Sti(ω)  S(E). Let ω ∈ S ′. By 0. S ′  Sti(ω). Consider ωS(E). By 2.,
ti(ωS(E))(E) = ti(ω)(E)|S(E) ≥ p. Hence ωS(E) ∈ D. Thus ω ∈ D↑.
Finally, if Bpi (E) is empty, then by definition of the p-belief operator, we have B
p
i (E) =
∅S(E). 
B.4 Proof of Proposition 3
1. This property is equivalent to Bpi (E) ∪ Bpi ¬Bpi (E) ⊆ Ai(E). By Property 5. we have
Bpi (E) ⊆ Ai(E). To see that Bpi ¬Bpi (E) ⊆ Ai(E), note that ω ∈ Bpi ¬Bpi (E) if and only
if ti(ω)(¬Bpi (E)) ≥ p. This implies that Sti(ω)  S(¬Bpi (E)) = S(E). The last equality
follows by Property 8 and Proposition 2. Hence ω ∈ Ai(E).
2. The proof is analogous to 1. The is property is equivalent to
⋂∞
n=1B
p
i (¬Bpi )n−1 (E) ⊆
Ai(E). ω ∈ Bpi (¬Bpi )n−1 (E) for any n = 1, 2, ... if and only it ti(ω)
(
(¬Bpi )n−1 (E)
)
≥ p
for any n = 1, 2, .... It follows that Sti(ω)  S
(
(¬Bpi )n−1 (E)
)
for any n = 1, 2, .... By
Proposition 2, S
(
(¬Bpi )n−1 (E)
)
= S(E) for any n = 1, 2, .... Hence ω ∈ Ai(E).
3. First, we show Bpi Ui(E) ⊆ Ai(E). ω ∈ Bpi Ui(E) if and only if ti(ω)(Ui(E)) ≥ p.
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It implies Sti(ω)  S(Ui(E)). By Proposition 1 S(Ui(E)) = S(E). Hence Sti(ω)  S(E)
which is equivalent to ω ∈ Ai(E).
Second, we show that Bpi Ui(E) = ∅S(E) for p ∈ (0, 1]. Since Bpi Ui(E) ⊆ Ai(E) we have
by monotonicity B1iB
p
i Ui(E) ⊆ B1iAi(E). By introspection Bpi Ui(E) ⊆ B1iBpi Ui(E) ⊆
B1iAi(E). By additivity, we have B
p
i Ui(E) ⊆ ¬B1iAi(E). Hence Bpi Ui(E) = ∅S(E) =
¬B1iAi(E) ∩B1iAi(E).
Third, we show that B0i Ui(E) = Ai(E). ω ∈ Ai(E) if and only if ω ∈ AiUi(E) since
by AA-self-reflection Ai(E) = AiAi(E) and by symmetry AiAi(E) = AiUi(E). Hence,
if ω ∈ Ai(E) then ti(ω)(Ui(E)) is defined. Therefore ω ∈ B0i Ui(E), and hence Ai(E) ⊆
B0i Ui(E). Together with the first part of the proof, we conclude B
0
i Ui(E) = Ai(E).
4. This property is equivalent to AiUi(E) = Ai(E). ω ∈ AiUi(E) if and only if
Sti(ω)  S(Ui(E)) = S(Ai(E)) = S(E) by Proposition 1. Hence ω ∈ AiUi(E) if and only
if ω ∈ Ai(E).
5. ω ∈ Ai(E) if and only if Sti(ω)  S(E). For any ti(ω), we have Sti(ω)  S(E) if
and only if 1 = ti(ω)(S(E)
↑). This is equivalent to ω ∈ B1i (S(E)↑).
6. First, we show Bpi (E) ⊆ Ai(E). ω ∈ Bpi (E) if and only if ti(ω)(E) ≥ p. This
implies that Sti(ω)  S(E), which is equivalent to ω ∈ Ai(E).
Second, we show for p = 0, Ai(E) ⊆ B0i (E). ω ∈ Ai(E) if and only if ti(ω) ∈ ∆(S)
with S  S(E). Hence ti(ω)(E) ≥ 0, which implies that ω ∈ B0i (E).
7. ω ∈ Bpi (E) if and only if ti(ω)(E) ≥ p. This implies that Sti(ω)  S(E). By
Proposition 2 it is equivalent to Sti(ω)  S(Bqi (E)), which is equivalent to ω ∈ AiBqi (E).
8. By the definition of negation, S(E) = S(¬E). Hence for ti(ω) ∈ 4(S), S  S(E)
if and only if S  S(¬E).
9. ω ∈ ⋂λ∈LAi(Eλ) if and only if Sti(ω)  S(Eλ) for all λ ∈ L. This is equivalent to
Sti(ω)  supλ∈L S(Eλ) = S
(⋂
λ∈LEλ
)
, which is equivalent to ω ∈ Ai
(⋂
λ∈LEλ
)
.
10. By Proposition 2, S(E) = S(Bpi (E)). Hence, ω ∈ Ai(E) if and only if ω ∈
AiB
p
i (E).
11. By Proposition 1, S(E) = S(Ai(E)). Hence ω ∈ Ai(E) if and only if ω ∈ AiAi(E).
12. ω ∈ BpiAi(E) if and only if ti(ω)(Ai(E)) ≥ p. This implies Sti(ω)  S(Ai(E)).
By Proposition 1, S(Ai(E)) = S(E). Thus ω ∈ Ai(E). To see the converse, by weak
necessitation and introspection, Ai(E) = B
1
i (S(E)
↑) ⊆ B1iB1i (S(E)↑) = B1iAi(E). By
Proposition 9 (o), B1iAi(E) ⊆ BpiAi(E). 
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B.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Note that Ui(E) = S(E)
↑ \ Ai(E) = {ω ∈ S(E)↑ : ti(ω) ∈ ∆(S) s.t. S  S(E)} =
{ω ∈ Ω : Sti(ω)  S(E) and Sω  S(E)}. The result now follows from the fact that
ti(ω)(S(E)
↑) = 1 if Sti(ω)  S(E). 
B.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Note that S(S(E)↑) = S(¬E) = S(E). If Sti(ω)  S(E) and Sω  S(E), then
tZi (ω)(S(E)
↑) = tZi (ω)(E) = t
Z
i (ω)(¬E) = 0. Hence in this case ω ∈ Zi(S(E)↑)
and ω ∈ Zi(E) ∩ Zi(¬E). If Sti(ω)  S(E), then tZi (ω)(S(E)↑) = ti(ω)(S(E)↑) =
1 = ti(ω)(E) + ti(ω)(¬E) = tZi (ω)(E) + tZi (ω)(¬E). Hence ω /∈ Zi(S(E)↑) and ω /∈
Zi(E) ∩ Zi(¬E). 
B.7 Proof of Proposition 6
“⊇”: Ui(E) = Zi(S(E)↑) ⊆ Zi(E) where the first equality follows from Proposition 4 and
second inclusion follows from Proposition 5. B1i (¬E) ⊆ Ai(E). Clearly, B1i (¬E) ⊆ Zi(E).
“⊆”: ω ∈ Zi(E) if and only if tZi (ω)(E) = 0. If tZi (ω)(¬E) = 0, then ω ∈ Zi(S(E)↑) by
Proposition 5. Thus ω ∈ Ui(E) by Proposition 4. If tZi (ω)(¬E) > 0, then tZi (ω)(¬E) = 1.
Then ω ∈ B1i (¬E) ⊆ Ai(E). 
B.8 Proof of Proposition 7
We only have to show:
1. tFi : Ω −→ ∆(Ω,F) is measurable, where ∆(Ω,F) is endowed with the sigma-
algebra generated by sets {µ ∈ ∆(Ω,F) : µ(E) ≥ p} for p ∈ [0, 1] and E ∈ F .
2. For all ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ I, and E ∈ F : If [tFi (ω)] = {ω′ ∈ Ω : tFi (ω′) = tFi (ω)} ⊆ E, then
tFi (ω)(E) = 1.
But both properties follow directly from the respective properties in the unawareness
belief structure Ω. 
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B.9 Proof of Theorem 1
Before we prove the theorem, we state following observations:
Remark 5 If P =
(
P S
)
S∈S ∈
∏
S∈S ∆(S) is a positive (common) prior, then also P
S ∈
∆(S) is positive (common) prior on S for every S ∈ S.
Remark 6 If µi ∈ ∆(S) is a positive prior for player i on S and S ′  S, then the
marginal of µi on S
′,
(
µSi
)
|S′ is a positive prior for player i on S
′.
Lemma 2 Let P S be a positive common prior on some finite state-space S and let i ∈
I and ω ∈ Σ such that ti (ω) ∈ 4 (S). Then we have for all ω′ ∈ [ti (ω)] ∩ S that
ti (ω) ({ω′}) = PS({ω′})PS([ti(ω)]∩S) .
Proof of the Lemma. Because ti (ω) = ti (ω
′), we have Ai
(
S↑
)
= Ai
(
{ω′}↑
)
⊇
[ti (ω)]
↑ ⊇ {ω′}↑. By the definition of a prior on S, P S ({ω′}) = P S
(
{ω′}↑ ∩ Ai
(
{ω′}↑
))
=∫
Ai({ω′}↑)∩S
ti (·)
(
{ω′}↑
)
dP S (·). Note that if ω′′ ∈ S \ [ti (ω)] ∩ S, then we do have
ti (ω
′′)
(
{ω′}↑
)
= 0. Hence, since ti (ω) = ti (ω
′′), for ω′′ ∈ [ti (ω)], we have∫
Ai({ω′}↑)∩S
ti (·)
(
{ω′}↑
)
dP S (·) = ∫
[ti(ω)]∩S
ti (·) ({ω′}) dP S (·) = ti (ω) ({ω′})P S ([ti (ω)] ∩ S).
Because P S is positive, it follows that ti (ω) ({ω′}) = PS({ω′})PS([ti(ω)]∩S) . 
Proof of the Theorem. The idea of the proof is follows: First, if the set of states
in which there is common certainty that the first player’s expectation is strictly above α
and the second player’s expectations is weakly below α is nonempty, there is a minimal
state-space such that the common certainty event restricted to this space is nonempty.
Second, this restricted common certainty event is a belief closed subset in which beliefs
are stationary. Third, this set, together with the restriction of types to this set constitutes
a standard state-space to which a standard no-trade argument can be applied.
Note that E>α1 and E
≤α
2 may not be events in our unawareness belief structure. The
definition of the belief operator as well as Proposition 9 and 10 can be extended to
measurable subsets of Ω. The proofs are analogous and thus omitted.
Suppose that CB1
(
E>α1 ∩ E≤α2
)
is non-empty. Then fix a -minimal state-space S
such that W := CB1
(
E>α1 ∩ E≤α2
)∩S 6= ∅. Such a space S exists by the finiteness of Σ.
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By Remark 5, since P is a positive common prior, P S is a positive common prior on
S.
Since W = CB1
(
E>α1 ∩ E≤α2
)∩S ⊆ S∩B1i (CB1 (E>α1 ∩ E≤α2 )) , the minimality of S
implies that for each ω ∈ CB1 (E>α1 ∩ E≤α2 )∩S we do have Sti(ω) = S and ti (ω) (W ) = 1.
By the definition, ti (ω) ([ti (ω)] ∩ S) = 1, for each ω ∈ CB1
(
E>α1 ∩ E≤α2
) ∩ S. Since
ti(ω)(W ) = 1, we have ti (ω) (([ti (ω)] ∩ S) \W ) = 0.
By Lemma 2, this implies that P S ({ω′}) = 0, for ω′ ∈ ([ti (ω)] ∩ S) \W such that
ω ∈ CB1 (E>α1 ∩ E≤α2 ) ∩ S. It follows that P S (([ti (ω)] ∩ S) \W ) = 0 and hence,
P S (([ti (ω)] ∩ S) ∩W ) = P S ([ti (ω)] ∩ S)− P S (([ti (ω)] ∩ S) \W ) = P S ([ti (ω)] ∩ S) >
0. So, we do have P S (W ) > 0.
The fact that P S ({ω′}) = 0, for ω′ ∈ ([ti (ω)] ∩ S)\W such that ω ∈ CB1
(
E>α1 ∩ E≤α2
)∩
S = W implies the following: For any random variable x, we have
∑
ω′∈[ti(ω)]∩S x (ω
′)P S ({ω′}) =∑
ω′∈W∩[ti(ω)]∩S x (ω
′)P S ({ω′}), if [ti (ω)] ∩W 6= ∅. And also
∑
ω∈W x(ω)P
S ({ω}) =∑
[ti(ω)]∩W 6=∅
∑
ω∈[ti(ω)]∩S x(ω)P
S ({ω}). This is so, because there is a ω ∈ [ti (ω)]∩W and
for this ω, we do have ω ∈ CB1 (E>α1 ∩ E≤α2 ) ∩ S and [ti (ω)] = [ti (ω)] and this implies
P S (([ti (ω)] ∩ S) \W ) = 0.
For i = 1, 2 we have∑
ω∈W
P S ({ω})
∑
ω′∈[ti(ω)]∩S
v (ω′) ti (ω) ({ω′})
=
∑
ω∈W
P S ({ω})
∑
ω′∈[ti(ω)]∩S
v (ω′)
P S ({ω′})
P S ([ti (ω)] ∩ S)
=
∑
[ti(ω)]∩W 6=∅
∑
ω∈[ti(ω)]∩S
P S ({ω})
∑
ω′∈[ti(ω)]∩S
v (ω′)
P S ({ω′})
P S ([ti (ω)] ∩ S)
=
∑
[ti(ω)]∩W 6=∅
∑
ω∈[ti(ω)]∩S
P S ({ω})
∑
ω′∈[ti(ω)]∩S
v (ω′)
P S ({ω′})
P S ([ti (ω)] ∩ S)
=
∑
[ti(ω)]∩W 6=∅
P S ([ti (ω)] ∩ S)
∑
ω′∈[ti(ω)]∩S
v (ω′)
P S ({ω′})
P S ([ti (ω)] ∩ S)
=
∑
[ti(ω)]∩W 6=∅
∑
ω′∈[ti(ω)]∩S
v (ω′)P S ({ω′})
=
∑
ω′∈W
v (ω′)P S ({ω′}) .
But by the assumptions, we have
∑
ω∈W P
S ({ω})∑ω′∈[t1(ω)]∩S v (ω′) t1 (ω) ({ω′}) >
αP S (W ) and
∑
ω∈W P
S ({ω})∑ω′∈[t2(ω)]∩S v (ω′) t2 (ω) ({ω′}) ≤ αP S (W ), a contradic-
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tion, since P S (W ) > 0. 
B.10 Proof of Proposition 8
Before we prove the proposition, we require following auxiliary results:
Remark 7 For any ω ∈ Ω, ti(ω)(E ∩ Ai(E)) = ti(ω)(E) for any event E s.t. S(E) 
Sti(ω).
Proof of the Remark: Let E be an event and ti(ω) be such that S(E)  Sti(ω).
Since E = (E ∩ Ai(E)) ∪ (E ∩ Ui(E)) and Ai(E) ∩ Ui(E) = ∅S(E), we have (E ∩
Ai(E))∩ (E ∩Ui(E)) = ∅S(E). Since ti(ω) is an additive probability measure, ti(ω)(E) =
ti(ω)(E ∩ Ai(E)) + ti(ω)(E ∩ Ui(E)). Since Bpi Ui(E) = ∅S(E) for p ∈ (0, 1] (BpU -
Introspection in Proposition 3), we must have ti(ω)(E ∩ Ui(E)) = 0. 
We slightly abuse terminology and call a probability measure µi ∈ ∆ (S) a prior for
player i on S if for every event E ∈ Σ with S(E)  S equation (1u) is satisfied, i.e.,
µi(E ∩ S ∩ Ai(E)) =
∫
S∩Ai(E)
ti(·)(E)dµi(·). (3)
The following lemma says that if there is a prior on a state-space then the marginal
on a lower space is a prior as well.
Lemma 3 If µ ∈ ∆ (S ′) is a prior for player i on S ′ and S  S ′, then (µ)|S (the marginal
of µ on S) is a prior for player i on S.
Proof of the Lemma. Let E be an event with S(E)  S and let µ be in-
dividual i’s prior probability measure on S ′ with S ′  S. We have to show that
µ
(
(rS′S )
−1(E ∩ S ∩ Ai(E))
)
=
∫
S∩Ai(E) ti(·)(E)dµ(·). Since S(E)  S, and by Proposi-
tion 1 S(Ai(E)) = S(E), it follows that (r
S′
S )
−1(E ∩ S ∩ Ai(E)) = E ∩ S ′ ∩ Ai(E),
and therefore µ|S(E ∩ S ∩ Ai(E)) = µ(E ∩ S ′ ∩ Ai(E)). So it remains to show that∫
S∩Ai(E) ti(·)(E ∩ Ai(E))d(µ|S)(·) =
∫
S′∩Ai(E) ti(·) (E ∩ Ai(E)) dµ(·).
We first show the following Claim: Let ω ∈ S(E)  S  S ′ such that ω ∈ Ai(E).
Then ti(ω)(E ∩ Ai(E)) = ti(ωS)(E ∩ Ai(E)).
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Proposition 1, ω ∈ Ai(E) and S(E)  S imply that ωS ∈ Ai(E). We have that
ω ∈ Ai(E) implies ti(ω)(E ∩Ai(E)) = ti(ω)(E ∩Ai(E)∩Sti(ω)). By 3 of Definition 1, we
have Sti(ωS)  Sti(ω). And by 1 of Definition 1 ti(ωS)(E ∩ Ai(E)) = ti(ωS)(E ∩ Ai(E) ∩
Sti(ωS)) = ti(ωSti(ωS))(E ∩ Ai(E) ∩ Sti(ωS)). By 2 of Definition 1, we have ti(ωSti(ωS))(E ∩
Ai(E) ∩ Sti(ωS)) = ti(ω)((r
Sti(ω)
Sti(ωS)
)−1(E ∩ Ai(E) ∩ Sti(ωS))) = ti(ω)(E ∩ Ai(E) ∩ Sti(ω)) =
ti(ω)(E ∩ Ai(E)). Hence the claim is proved.
We have∫
Ai(E)∩S
ti(·)(Ai(E) ∩ E)d(µ|S)(·) =
∫
Ai(E)∩S′
ti(r
S′
S (·))(Ai(E) ∩ E)dµ(·)
=
∫
Ai(E)∩S′
ti(·)(Ai(E) ∩ E)dµ(·),
where the first equation follows from the definition of marginal and the second from the
above claim. 
We say that µ ∈ ∆ (S) is a common prior on S if it is a prior on S for every player
i ∈ I.
Remark 8 Let Sˆ be the upmost state-space in the lattice S, and let (P Si )S∈S ∈
∏
S∈S ∆(S)
be a tuple of probability measures. Then (P Si )S∈S is a prior for player i if and only if P
Sˆ
i
is a prior for player i on Sˆ and P Si is the marginal of P
Sˆ
i for every S ∈ S.
This remark together with Lemma 3 implies the following:
Remark 9 A common prior (Definition 9) induces a common prior on S, for any S ∈ S.
The converse is not necessarily true unless S is the upmost state-space of the lattice. Note
that it is possible that players have different priors, but at some space S (below the upmost
space) the priors on S coincide. Hence, in such a case they have different priors, but
a common prior on S (and by Lemma 3 also a common prior on spaces less expressive
than S).
We are now ready to prove Proposition 8. In fact, we prove below a version just requir-
ing the existence of a common prior P S on S such that S(G)  S and P S(CB1(⋂i∈I [ti(G) =
pi])) > 0. By Remark 9, this is more general than the statement of Proposition 8.
Proof of Proposition 8. By Proposition 10, ω ∈ CB1(F ) if and only if there exists
an event E that is evident such that ω ∈ E ⊆ B1(F ).
37
Since for an evident E we have E ⊆ B1i (E) ⊆ Ai(E) for all i ∈ I. It follows that
P S(E ∩ Ai(E)) = P S(E) for S  S(E). Set F =
⋂
i∈I [ti(G) = pi] and let E = CB
1(F ).
By Proposition 1, S(E) = S(G). By Lemma 3 and the properties imposed on ti, we
consider w.l.o.g. a common prior P S(G) on S(G).
P S(G)(E) =
∫
S(G)∩Ai(E)
ti(·)(E)dP S(G)(·)
=
∫
E∩S(G)∩Ai(E)
ti(·)(E)dP S(G)(·) +
∫
(S(G)∩Ai(E))\E
ti(·)(E)dP S(G)(·).∫
E∩S(G)∩Ai(E)
ti(·)(E)dP S(G)(·) =
∫
E∩S(G)∩Ai(E)
1dP S(G)(·) = P S(G)(E).
The second last equation above follows from the fact that E is evident. So, we have
E ⊆ B1i (E), that is ti(·)(E) = 1, for ω ∈ E. It follows that∫
(S(G)∩Ai(E))\E
ti(·)(E)dP S(G)(·) = 0. (4)
∫
E∩Ai(E)∩S(G)
ti(·)(G)dP S(G)(·) =
∫
E∩Ai(E)∩S(G)
pidP
S(G)(·) = piP S(G)(E)
If ω ∈ E = CB1(F ), then ω ∈ E ⊆ B1i (F ) ⊆ B1i ([ti(G) = pi]). Note that [ti(G) =
pi] = B
pi
i (G) ∩ B1−pii (¬G). Therefore, by monotonicity B1i ([ti(G) = pi]) ⊆ B1i (Bpii (G)) ∩
B1i (B
1−pi
i (¬G)). Introspection II implies now that ω ∈ Bpii (G)∩B1−pii (¬G) = [ti(G) = pi].
So we have ti (ω) (G) = pi, for ω ∈ E.
∫
E∩Ai(E)∩S(G)
ti(·)(G)dP S(G)(·) =
∫
E∩Ai(E)∩S(G)
ti(·)(G ∩ E)dP S(G)(·)
=
∫
S(G)∩Ai(E)
ti(·)(G ∩ E)dP S(G)(·)
−
∫
(S(G)∩Ai(E))\E
ti(·)(G ∩ E)dP S(G)(·).
Since by the monotonicity of probability measures∫
(S(G)∩Ai(E))\E
ti(·)(G ∩ E)dP S(G)(·) ≤
∫
(S(G)∩Ai(E))\E
ti(·)(E)dP S(G)(·),
we must have by equation (4) and non-negativity of probability measures∫
(S(G)∩Ai(E))\E
ti(·)(G ∩ E)dP S(G)(·) = 0.
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Note that P S(G)(G ∩ E) = ∫
S(G)∩Ai(E) ti(·)(G ∩ E)dP S(G)(·).
Note further that P S(G)(E) = P S(G)(E ∩ Ai(E)) for all i ∈ N since E = CB1(F ) ⊆
Ai(E) for all i ∈ N . Similarly, P S(G)(G ∩ E) = P S(G)(G ∩ E ∩ Ai(E)) for all i ∈ N .
Thus
piP
S(G)(E) = P S(G)(G ∩ E). (5)
Note that by assumption P S(G)(E) > 0.
Since equation (5) holds for all i ∈ I, we must have pi = pj, for all i, j ∈ I. 
B.11 Proof of Remark 4
By Lemma 1 each [ti(E) = pi] is an S(G)-based event. By the definition of the con-
junction of events,
⋂
i∈I [ti(G) = pi] is an S(G)-based event. As remarked after the
definition of the CB1-operator (page 18), this implies that CB1(
⋂
i∈I [ti(G) = pi]) is an
S(G)-based event. Since by assumption this event is nonempty, its base, that is its in-
tersection with S(G), must be nonempty. Therefore, since by assumption S  S(G),
S ∩ CB1(⋂i∈I [ti(G) = pi]) must be nonempty (recall that the rS′S are surjective, when-
ever defined). The positivity of P S implies now that P S(CB1(
⋂
i∈I [ti(G) = pi])) =
P S(S ∩ CB1(⋂i∈I [ti(G) = pi])) > 0. 
B.12 Proof of Proposition 9
(0) Bpi (E) ⊆ Bqi (E) for p, q ∈ [0, 1] with q ≤ p is trivial.
(i) B1i (Ω) ⊆ Ω holds trivially. In the reverse direction, note that ti(ω)(Ω) = ti(ω)(Ω∩
Sti(ω)) = ti(ω)(Sti(ω)) = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω. Thus Ω ⊆ B1i (Ω).
(ii) ω ∈ Bpi (E) if and only if ti(ω)(E) ≥ p. Since ti(ω) is an additive probability
measure, ti(ω)(¬E) ≤ 1− p. Hence ω ∈ ¬Bqi (¬E) for q > 1− p.
(iiia) ω ∈ Bpi (
⋂∞
l=1El) if and only if ti(ω) (
⋂∞
l=1El) ≥ p. Monotonicity of the prob-
ability measure ti(ω) implies ti(ω)(El) ≥ p for all l = 1, 2, ..., which is equivalent to
ω ∈ ⋂∞l=1Bpi (El).
(iiib) It is enough to show that any sequence of events {El}∞l=1 with El ⊇ El+1
for l = 1, 2, ... we have Bpi (
⋂∞
l=1 El) ⊇
⋂∞
l=1 B
p
i (El). ω ∈
⋂∞
l=1 B
p
i (El) if and only if
ti(ω)(El) ≥ p for l = 1, 2, .... Since ti(ω) is a countable additive probability measure, it is
continuous from above. That is, if El ⊇ El+1 for l = 1, 2, ..., we have liml→∞ ti(ω)(El) =
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ti(ω) (
⋂∞
l=1El). Since for every l = 1, 2, ..., ti(ω)(El) ≥ p, we have p ≤ liml→∞ ti(ω)(El) =
ti(ω) (
⋂∞
l=1El). Hence ω ∈ Bpi (
⋂∞
l=1El).
(iiic) It is enough to show that B1i (
⋂∞
l=1El) ⊇
⋂∞
l=1B
1
i (El). ω ∈
⋂∞
l=1B
1
i (El) if
and only if ti(ω)(El) = 1 for l = 1, 2, .... Since ti(ω) is a countable additive probability
measure, it satisfies Bonferroni’s Inequality. I.e., ti(ω) (
⋂∞
l=1El) ≥ 1−
∑∞
l=1 1− ti(ω)(El).
Since ti(ω)(El) = 1 for all l = 1, 2, ..., we have 1 − ti(ω)(El) = 0 for all l = 1, 2, ..., and
hence
∑∞
l=1 1 − ti(ω)(El) = 0. It follows that ti(ω) (
⋂∞
l=1El) = 1. We conclude that
ω ∈ B1i (
⋂∞
l=1 El).
(iv) Since ti(ω) is a probability measure (satisfying monotonicity) for any ω ∈ Ω,
E ⊆ F implies that if ti(ω)(E) ≥ p then ti(ω)(F ) ≥ p.
(va) Let ω ∈ Bpi (E). Then ti(ω)(E) ≥ p. It follows that for all ω′ ∈ Beni(ω) we have
ti(ω
′)(E) ≥ p. Hence Beni(ω) ⊆ Bpi (E). Thus ti(ω)(Bpi (E)) = 1, which implies that
ω ∈ B1iBpi (E).
(vb) Let ω ∈ Bpi (Bqi (E)), for some p ∈ (0, 1] and assume by contradiction that
ω /∈ Bqi (E). Then, since by Propositions 1 and 2 ω ∈ Ai(E), we must have q > 0 and
ω ∈ B1−ri (¬E) for some r with q > r ≥ 0. By (va), we have ω ∈ B1i
(
B1−ri (¬E)
)
. Note
that B1−ri (¬E) and Bqi (E) are disjoint because of (ii), and hence B1−ri (¬E) ⊆ ¬Bqi (E).
Monotonicity implies now that ω ∈ B1i (¬Bqi (E)) , hence, by (ii) ω ∈ ¬Bpi (Bqi (E)) a
contradiction to ω ∈ Bpi (Bqi (E)). 
B.13 Proof of Proposition 11
1. By Proposition 1, S(E) = S(Aj(E)). Hence ω ∈ Ai(E) if and only if ω ∈ AiAj(E).
2. By Proposition 2, S(E) = S(Bpj (E)). Hence, ω ∈ Ai(E) if and only if ω ∈ AiBpj (E).
3. ω ∈ Bpi (E) if and only if ti(ω)(E) ≥ p. This implies that Sti(ω)  S(E). By Propo-
sition 2, this is equivalent to Sti(ω)  S(Bqj (E)), which is equivalent to ω ∈ AiBqj (E).
4. The proof is analogous to 3.
5. We show by induction that An(E) = A(E), for all n ≥ 1. We have ω ∈ A(An(E))
if and only if Sti(ω)  S(An(E)), for all i ∈ I, which, by the induction hypothesis, is the
case if and only if Sti(ω)  S(A(E)), for all i ∈ I. By the definition of “∩”, it is the case
that S(A(E)) = supi∈IS(Ai(E)). By Proposition 1 we have S(Ai(E)) = S(E) and hence
S(A(E)) = S(E). It follows that Sti(ω)  S(A(E)) if and only if Sti(ω)  S(E). But
Sti(ω)  S(E) if and only if ω ∈ Ai(E). Hence we have An(E) = A(E), for all n ≥ 1, and
therefore CA(E) = A(E).
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6. ω ∈ CB1(E) implies ω ∈ B1i (E) for all i ∈ I. This is equivalent to ti(ω)(E) = 1
for all i ∈ I, which implies Sti(ω)  S(E) for all i ∈ I. Hence, by 5. we have ω ∈ A(E) =
CA(E).
7. First, we show that Bp(E) ⊆ A(E). ω ∈ Bp(E) if and only if ti(ω)(E) ≥ p for all
i ∈ I. Hence ti(ω) ∈ ∆(S) with S  S(E), for all i ∈ I. This implies that ω ∈ Ai(E),
for all i ∈ I. It follows that ω ∈ A(E).
Second, we show that A(E) = B0(E). ω ∈ A(E) if and only if ω ∈ Ai(E) for all i ∈ I
if and only if (by 6. of Proposition 3) ω ∈ B0i (E) for all i ∈ I if and only if ω ∈ B0(E).
8. The proof follows from 7. and 5.
9. By weak necessitation, A(E) :=
⋂
i∈I Ai(E) =
⋂
i∈I B
1
i (S(E)
↑) := B1(S(E)↑).
10. The proof follows from 9. and 5.
11. By definition of common certainty, CB1(S(E)↑) ⊆ B1(S(E)↑). By 9., B1(S(E)↑) =
A(E).
12. The proof follows from 11. and 5. 
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